


# Privacy Issues in Geospatial Visual Analytics



The screenshot displays the MODAP website interface. On the left is a navigation menu with the following items:

- About
  - About MODAP
  - About Privacy on the Move
  - MODAP Member Institutions
  - How to Join MODAP
  - Related Links
  - Working Groups

The main content area features the MODAP logo (a stylized figure in a red circle) and the text "MODAP mobility, data mining, and privacy". Below the logo is a banner image showing two silhouettes of people looking at a map. The banner includes the text "MODAP Events", "Newsletters", and "Resources".

## Mobility, Data Mining and Privacy

### MODAP Event Highlights

Fraunhofer IAIS Workshop on Privacy-Aware Mobility Mining With Mobile Phone Data  
Schloss Birlinghoven, Sankt Augustin, Germany, 26 November, 2010  
Website: [ws-gsm2010.modap.org](http://ws-gsm2010.modap.org)

SPRINGL2010 3rd ACM SIGSPATIAL International Workshop on Security and Privacy in GIS and LBS (SPRINGL) 2010  
Website: [springl2010.modap.org](http://springl2010.modap.org)

First MODAP Summer School  
Rhodes, Greece, August 27th-September 1st, 2010  
Website: [mss2010.modap.org](http://mss2010.modap.org)

Gennady Andrienko  
Natalia Andrienko


<http://geoanalytics.net/and>

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
## Privacy issues

- Lots of personal data containing locations can be (automatically) collected and are actually collected:
  - Mobile phone use, car tracking, video observation, use of bank cards, ...
- People can also make their locations known to others through Web2.0:
  - Georeferenced photos in flickr and Panoramio, Twitter messages, ...
- These data can be (and often should be or need to be) analyzed and are actually analyzed
- The analyses may disclose potentially sensitive personal information
- Visual analytics approaches can aggravate the problem
  - Enables human-computer collaboration where each side applies its unique capabilities
  - Humans use their knowledge, experience, common sense; can easily relate pieces of information; do not require formal representations


# Example 1: GPS tracks of a personal car







# Spatial clusters of stops for $\geq 30$ minutes




Home!



Work!




Shopping!




## What was learned about the car owner:

- The places where the person lives, works, and shops and the places the person sometimes visits
- The durations of the stops; the times spent in the shopping areas
- The usual times of the trips and stops
- The typical routes and their distribution over time (daily and weekly patterns)




### Other inferred personal information:

- The person has a flexible work schedule, has no small children, is often away or sick




*green: home to work  
red: work to home  
blue: home – home*


## Example 2: Photos in flickr or Panoramio



# Repeated meetings of people



| <input type="checkbox"/> identifiers | Overall frequency | Frequency after filtering |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| 311327;953473                        | 67                | 67                        |
| 311327;1367968                       | 50                | 50                        |
| 953473;1367968                       | 26                | 26                        |
| 1592718;1620799                      | 24                | 24                        |
| 311327;2038072                       | 8                 | 8                         |
| 953473;2038072                       | 5                 | 5                         |
| 1367968;2038072                      | 3                 | 3                         |
| 899174;953473                        | 2                 | 2                         |
| 899174;1367968                       | 2                 | 2                         |
| 1690654;2038072                      | 2                 | 2                         |
| 1592718;1962862                      | 2                 | 2                         |
| 1038820;2044833                      | 2                 | 2                         |
| 986555;1592718                       | 1                 | 1                         |
| 953473;1690654                       | 1                 | 1                         |
| 953473;1258045                       | 1                 | 1                         |
| 953473;1178121                       | 1                 | 1                         |
| 687113;1620799                       | 1                 | 1                         |



Users 311327, 953473, and 1367968 frequently meet each other in Berlin and sometimes meet also user 2038072.

Users 1592718 and 1620799 frequently meet.

...

| Pairwise interactions from Trajectories (time <...) |        |                  |                  |  |
|---|--------|------------------|------------------|--|
| 129: [11/06/2008 12:42 - 11/06/2008 14:48]          |        |                  |                  |  |
| Id  | Name   | Earliest time    | Latest time      |  |
| 311327  | 311327 | 11/06/2008 12:42 | 11/06/2008 14:48 |  |
| 953473  | 953473 | 11/06/2008 12:55 | 11/06/2008 14:05 |  |
| 171: [28/06/2008 12:44 - 28/06/2008 14:16]          |        |                  |                  |  |
| Id  | Name   | Earliest time    | Latest time      |  |
| 311327  | 311327 | 28/06/2008 12:44 | 28/06/2008 14:16 |  |
| 953473  | 953473 | 28/06/2008 13:37 | 28/06/2008 14:08 |  |

## Example 3: the iPhone case

- Availability of important but challenging spatio-temporal data sets (geospatial imagery, sensors, GPS and movement tracking, geo-tagging, flickr, wiki, ...)
  - Sometimes {unintentionally} breaking personal privacy






Image courtesy of <http://petewarden.github.com/iPhoneTracker/>





# Are iPhone data really dangerous for {my} personal privacy?

- At large scale: definitely YES – show which cities have been visited and when





# Are iPhone data really dangerous for {my} personal privacy?

- At small scale: probably NO – real mobility patterns are not visible



# iPhone data: cross-checking with other data sources (positions of photos)



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
## What is special about human's involvement in analysis?

- A human flexibly links data and extracted patterns to *context*
  - *Spatial (geographic) context*: properties of places, spatial objects and their properties, spatial relationships
  - *Temporal context*: properties of time moments and intervals, temporal objects (events and processes) and their properties, temporal relationships
  - *Conceptual context*: general and domain-specific concepts and their relationships
- The context does not need to be formally or even explicitly represented
- A human flexibly infers new information by linking pieces of known information

### Hence, how can (geo)visual analytics contribute to privacy protection?


- Try to describe the context
  - Try to describe the possible inferences
- } to inform and direct the privacy protection research

# Examples of describing context and inferences





Temporal context:

- days of the week
- times of the day



Conceptual context:

- activities of people
- typical days and times of the activities
- typical durations
- typical places




Long stops in the evenings of the working days and at any time in the weekends ⇒ Home!

Long stops in the mornings of the working days and no stops in the weekends ⇒ Work!

Stops  $\geq 30$  minutes in shopping areas ⇒ Shopping!

Spatial context:

- shopping areas




## Another possible contribution: generalization





Generalization and aggregation are used to visualize large amounts of data and avoid display clutter.

# Generalization as an approach to privacy protection



# Variable generalization level depending on data density





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## Inter-disciplinary collaboration needed

Geovisual analytics + privacy protection research

Positive example:

A.Monreale, G.Andrienko, N.Andrienko, F.Giannotti, D.Pedreschi, S.Rinzivillo, S.Wrobel

**Movement Data Anonymity through Generalization**

*Transactions on Data Privacy*, 2010, v.3 (3), pp. 91-121

<http://www.tdp.cat/issues/abs.a045a10.php>

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## Conclusion

- Space- and time-referenced data may allow extraction of sensitive personal information
- Geovisual analytics enables humans to establish links and make inferences
- Humans can do this more flexibly than computers
  - Do not require formal representation, can deal with incomplete information, can use previous knowledge and experience, ...
- Researchers on privacy protection focus on automated analysis methods and may overlook the capabilities of human analysts
- Geovisual analytics should collaborate with privacy research
  - to identify potential risks to personal privacy from involving humans in analysis
  - to use visual analytics approaches for privacy protection

<http://www.modap.org>

**MODAP**  
mobility, data mining, and privacy

**Mobility, Data Mining and Privacy**

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